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 Abstract 
 
 The modern era is profoundly marked by the idea of a subjective consciousness. This idea remains 
fundamental, not only in Descartes, but in all currents of thought using the distinction between the subjective and the 
objective – even if it is not always recognized as such. There is, however, a difference between perception and 
apperception which remained unclear in the Cartesian conception of consciousness, but which was articulated by 
Leibniz and became a major theme of philosophical psychology in the 18th and 19th century. From the beginning of 
the 19th century the discussion was also complicated by the concept of the unconscious, which in a way means a 
rediscovery of the Aristotelian psyche.  
 What should we understand by apperception: a self-consciousness, a consciousness of second degree, a 
retroactive awareness or reflection, a stream of consciousness or perhaps something rather like insight? Which is the 
relation between sensation, perception and apperception and in which sense are these irreducibly psychic functions? 
The article suggests some possibilities for describing the ontological status of experience. 
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 Apperception and Experience. Some Ontological Perspectives  
 
 
 Definitions (in progress) 
 
 Stipulating definitions at the beginning of a text can seem quite artificial, especially if one 
adheres to the conception of language as a medium of thought, which has to be respected as a source 
of often unexpected insights. While I still wish to begin in this way, it should be stressed that the 
definitions below are at the same time preliminary and resultative; preliminary insofar as they allow 
modifications and results to the extent that they express the current state of a philosophical 
interrogation. Thus they articulate central issues in my own struggles with the problem of 
apperception and experience in order to render the following text more accessible. 
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Quality (ontological quality) = qualified content which can appear as (qua) something (even when 
it does not appear). From an ontological point of view qualities are not properties of objects, but 
conditions of experience, i.e. of our exposition in and to reality.  
 
Pattern (ontological pattern) = dynamic determinate structure; relatively stable organisation, which 
exists even if not always actual. 
 
Presence = the actuality of what happens. 
 
Feeling = presence in experience. 
 
Sensation = feeling through sensually exposed qualities. 
 
Perception = intentional qualification of experience through variation of contents in order to deal with 
patterns (stressing orientation through discernment of the distinct).  
 
Intention = meaningful direction of experience. 
 
Apperception = awareness of own experience; experience with strong qualitative resonance. 
 
Qualitative resonance = felt presence of qualities. 
 






 Initial Remark  
 
 Apperception is not only an issue in philosophy, but in psychology, psychiatry and several 
other fields as well. One aspect often seems to create problems in interdisciplinary contexts: reality. 
It is difficult to conceive a philosophy without questions of reality, knowledge and experience. These 
areas of so called theoretical philosophy also imply statements concerning the role and scope of 
sciences, which is sometimes regarded almost as an intrusion. Philosophy, however, rarely has the 
ambition to give advice of how to practice different sciences. Its major concern is to point out 
something quite specific to its own approach, and if this is relevant to other sciences, it is for them to 
integrate it, exactly as philosophy necessarily must be acquainted with different fields of human 
culture, science included, in order to have something to reflect upon. When it comes to questions of 
what is real, and what is not, how something is real and how it is not, to questions of being, experience 
and knowledge, it is obvious that no other area of research would gain anything at all if philosophy 
would give up its ontological ambition – and I add, this ambition necessarily involves claims about 
fundamental dimensions of reality.  
 Philosophy has a perspective of its own. One should for example not expect a physicalist 
cosmology from a philosophical theory of being. Neither should one take an ontological hierarchy of 
perspectives for granted, as is often the case in more or less ideological popularizations of science, 
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which tend to reduce reality to a scientific object. Reality shows itself in many ways and the tension 
between different approaches is, one could say, precisely the primum movens of interdisciplinary 
discussions. For a philosopher it is natural to refer to several major figures of the history of philosophy 
and presume that they still have something important to tell us. He treats the classics as thematically 
relevant voices in contemporary discussions. Due to the cumulative and future-oriented character of 
modern experimental science, ancient research does not have the same status in this domain. 
Philosophy, on the contrary, is heavily concerned with presuppositions, and it is thus no coincidence 
that the older tradition maintains a central position in philosophical research. Conceptual, logical, 
philological and etymological questions also belong to this reflective strategy. Nothing is thus more 




 Choosing Words 
 
 A problem for every researcher using language, especially when the language is not artificial, 
is to find the most adequate expressions. In contemporary theory of perception, the English term 
"representation" is common and it suggests something like a second presentation of what has already 
once been presented. In order to evince this sense, one sometimes uses the simple expression 
"presentation" to indicate an activity which shows something in a particularly perceptible way. In 
German the word Vorstellung directly bears this sense of something being "put forth" and 
"presentation" could be a good English translation – if it would not stress the aspect of rendering 
present too much and neglect the ideal content of the Vorstellung. The third possible translation of 
this notion would be precisely idea. As the quite autonomous and dynamic sphere of imagery and 
ideal contents will be important in what follows, I hesitate which word to use. There would be some 
good reasons for "idea", even if a semantic tradition in the 20th century has often wanted to disqualify 
ideas, especially in the form they had in early modern philosophy. No need to mention that the concept 
is older and has a different meaning in Plato. This does not bother me as I have no problem with the 
platonic assumption that there exist both innate and acquired ideal contents. What I want to stress is 
however a qualitative dimension which is important when something appears. As the platonic ideas, 
these qualities are not pure presentations, but express a dimension, which exists in its own right and 
plays a decisive role in every appearance and experience. They are not, however, models for things 
in the platonic sense. On the contrary, I would like to stress the difference between qualitative contents  
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on the one hand and models or patterns on the other – and accord a fundamental importance to the 
modifications the original dimension of qualities can acquire through experience when it is confronted 
with patterns. I will also be careful not to follow the subjective interpretation Descartes gave to ideas. 
The purpose is instead to describe experience as an essential mode of reality and suggest what this 
could mean for apperception and its hermeneutic corollary (understanding, Verstehen). 
 
 
 Apperception, Consciousness, Subjectivity 
 
 Descartes' ambition was to find a new starting point for scientific methodology through a 
reinterpretation of the soul as consciousness. This new cogito differs from the Aristotelian psyche, 
which is a principle of life with strong sentient components. As Cartesian consciousness, the soul 
loses its disturbing natural and historical incarnation and takes the shape of an "archimedic point"1 
outside the natural and historical world, gets rid of prejudices and confuse ideas and thus – so is the 
intention – renders truly objective science possible. Kant later spoke of a pure consciousness as "the 
condition of possibility" of experience and knowledge and in this way draw the "critical" 
consequences of Descartes' methodological turn. Where Descartes struggled to establish a new 
method of research, Kant already took the new scientific approach for a settled matter and only wanted 
to find out, how it could be the case that such a successful research strategy was possible. In the same 
vein Kant explicitly stresses that the epistemologically important self-consciousness is not a 
contingent self-awareness, not an "empirical apperception", but a transcendental apperception, i.e. a 
necessary condition, which conveys unity to experience. Without the transcendental apperception we 
would not be able to combine experiences and perceive unity in the world.2  
 I will not speak about this Kantian solution that presupposes what Descartes meant to have 
shown: the existence of a pure I beyond natural and historical influence which is able to regard nature 
as a completely external world and thus to objectify this nature, to which the subject does not belong  
  
                     
1 AT VII, 24. French version: AT IX, 19. 
2 For Kant there is no conflict between perceptive and apperceptive consciousness and a certain kind of 
apperception is a direct condition of perception. It is in order to stress the necessary character of this 
condition that Kant distinguishes between empirical and transcendental apperception. Empirical 
apperception stands for passing awareness (there is "no standing and staying Ego", "kein stehendes oder 
bleibendes Selbst") and is close to imagination, whereas transcendental apperception means "the 'I think', 
which must be able to accompany all my representations", the "'ich denke', daß alle meine Vorstellungen 
muß begleiten können" and is thus a principle of unity, which must be presupposed in every experience. 
Kant 1990, A107 & B131-2.  
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anymore (as the Aristotelian thinking animal, the zôon logon echon did). Descartes himself was 
not quite clear about how the cogito should be understood and his descriptions vary: when it comes 
to undeniable evidence of existence he seems to mean a self-consciousness, but when he defends a 
new scientific paradigm, he rather stresses something like consciousness of objects. Leibniz was quite 
aware of this and explicitly introduced the distinction between perception and apperception, which 
Kant later differentiated. I quote from Leibniz' Principles Concerning Nature and Grace: "It is good 
to make the distinction between Perception, i.e. the internal state of the Monad representing external 
things, and the Apperception, i.e. the Consciousness or the reflective knowledge of this internal state, 
which is not given to all Souls, and not given to the same Soul all the time."3 The monad as the unified 
essence of a being can thus perceive things and it can perceive itself, but not all monads (or souls) are 
capable of perceiving themselves and even a monad capable of this, cannot apperceive all the time. 
Apperception is only occasional. This was exactly the reason for Kant to make the distinction between 
an empirical and a transcendental apperception. A purely occasional awareness can hardly be a 
condition of possibility of experience (Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung). Leibniz' view is 
not the Kantian. This must not necessarily mean that Leibniz lacks a differentiation, which Kant later 
offered. Like Aristotle and the Scholastics, Leibniz refuses to accord a foundational role to self-
consciousness and strongly defends what he calls les petites perceptions, the small perceptions, of 
which we are not aware and which are closely related to appetites, drives. Despite the metaphysical 
idea of a pre-established harmony and the rationalist tendency to link apperception to reason, the 
description of elementary "small" perceptions remains interesting, and it suggests an influence from 
the Aristotelian theory of aisthesis and orexis (striving) – even if Leibniz has a peculiar idea of a 
fundamental correspondence between particular experience and the totality of what exists.  
 It is difficult to settle the meaning of apperception, awareness of one's own experience, 
without deciding how to understand imagination, perception, sensation and intellection (which is a 
kind of conceptual perception) in relation to one another. Sensation is often understood as a direct 
perception in which the senses (sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell, possibly others) are involved, 
but it is not quite clear that we should call sensation perception at all as perceiving seems to imply 
that we perceive something quite distinct, whereas sensation alone furnishes little of such a 
determinate character. Much has been written on the problematic idea of sense data and many  
  
                     
3  "Ainsi il est bon de faire la distinction entre la Perception qui est l'état interieur de la Monade representant 
les choses externes, et l'Apperception qui est la Conscience, ou la connoissance reflexive de cet état interieur, 
laquelle n'est point donnée à toute les Ames, ny toujours à la même Ame." Leibniz 2013, Principes de la nature 
et de la grace 4.   
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philosophers tend to agree, that pure sensation cannot furnish any basis for how the world is 
perceived. Perception involves meaning and meaning is not constituted out of sense data. Sensation 
seems to be an aspect of perception, but not its basis.4 What is then exactly the contribution of 
sensation? Taking into account that datum means the given, could one perhaps understand the 
sense datum without any positivist assumptions of a sensitive and at the same time informational 




 Sensation, Perception, Apperception 
 
 The relation between sensation and perception became a major theme of philosophical 
psychology in the aftermath of Cartesian philosophy of mind. In 18th century France, not least 
through the discovery and translation of the writings of John Locke, empiricism became increasingly 
popular and even turned into a radical sensualism, represented mainly by Condillac, who in his well-
known book, Traité des sensations, wanted to extract all ideas from sensual impressions.5 This 
provocation gave rise to the movement of the so called ideologists (les idéologues), whose main 
concern was to understand the essence and especially the genesis of ideas. From this current of 
thought springs one of the major figures of early 19th century theory of apperception, Maine de Biran. 
In his important book on the problematic triad sensation, perception and apperception and in other 
earlier texts,6 Maine de Biran describes sensations as purely receptive and incapable of acquiring 
greater distinction in the course of an experiential act (even if they can create needs through 
habituation). Perceptions on the other hand demand an activity of the perceiver, a capacity which can 
evolve to a more distinct grasp of phenomena. Biran speaks of a double and contrary influence of 
habit on sensations and perceptions. In the case of purely receptive sensations, there is no active 
capacity and thus no experiential skill to improve. What happens through continuous or repeated 
sensations is that the sensation becomes increasingly dull. In the case of perception on the other hand, 
repetition and ongoing experience has a contrary influence which renders perceptions particularly 
valuable from an epistemological point of view: through habituation we acquire skills to discern.  
  
                     
4 Concerning sense data, a good survey is still: Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing, Swartz 1965. See 
especially the contribution “Sensation” by Gilbert Ryle.  
5 Condillac 1984. An extremely good overview of the empiricist influence in France before Condillac is 
found in Ross Hutchisons book Locke in France 1688-1734, Hutchison 1991. 
6 Maine de Biran 1995 and also Maine de Biran 1987. 
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 It is almost as if sensation would diminish when perception increases. How then should one 
understand apperception: as a passive faculty (which risks to become dull like repeated sensation) or 
as an activity with the same benefit for knowledge as perception?  
 Maine de Biran preferred the second answer, but was unable to solve the inherent problem 
concerning apperception. If we perceive the world through a capacity to discern more or less distinct 
objects, it seems that the capacities – and we as agents behind these capacities – are not what the 
perception is focusing on. When we see something in the world, we don't see our own seeing. In the 
case of reflection this is evident. Reflection is not the same thing as perception and it seems that 
apperception – if it is reflective in character – is primarily a matter neither of discerning nor of 
objectifying something. But regardless of the reflective character, apperception suggests a particular 
kind of experiential presence which seems to be something else than perception. What does this 
mean? 
 Could it be that apperception – like Damasio and Friedrich Schleiermacher long before him 
have suggested – is more like a feeling of what happens?7 Two questions then arise. There is the just 
mentioned one, if apperception – like sensation – follows the logic of becoming increasingly dull 
through the lapse of time and there is the question about qualities in apperception. How much content 
is implied if apperception is understood as a feeling? If apperception would be only such a presence, 
it is not clear how apperception would differ from affection. If we are not to regard self-awareness 
only as an affective state, apperception must be something more specific than presence as such. I will 
propose a version in which apperception is something instantaneously happening, but rich in content, 
because of a relatively strong qualitative resonance, which does not, like in the case of sensation, 
assume influence, and not, like in perception, deal with patterns, but interrogates the qualitative 




 Presence, Patterns and Contents 
 
 By pattern I mean, as one can see from the definitions, a dynamic determinate structure, which 
exists even if it is not always actual. It is natural for us to think that patterns exist, even when they 
have no manifestation. We are able to do many things without actually executing them. In fact, such 
behavioural dispositions are embedded in deeper organized layers and reflect ontological patterns 
which play an important role in the discovery of regularities in nature. A behavioural pattern exists 
even if it is not manifest at every moment. We should not think differently, when it comes to qualities.  
  
                     
7 Damasio 1999.  
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There is an ideal dimension of qualities, somehow linked to memory, which can come into play 
occasionally – like patterns can occasionally produce ordered processes. 
 Experience manifests the different aspects of interplay between patterns, presence and 
qualities. Patterns would be doomed to eternal latency without (potentially modifying) moments and 
they would lack experiential value without qualitative importance. In a similar way qualities need 
present actualization and patterns in order to impose themselves. One can also suppose that presence 
is somehow stimulated by the dynamics created by qualities and patterns. If qualitative contents 
deepen presence in apperception, perception on the contrary aims rather at a successful insertion in 
and mastering of patterns. This perceptual tendency cannot however be isolated into a purely 
epistemological relation. No distinct aspect of things would be perceived, if only determinate 
characters were there. A distinct thing is perceived if and only if it is presented in its distinction. 
Presence is thus a necessary condition of every perception and time is involved, because the present 
happens right now. This is what conducted thinkers like Saint Augustine to stress the ontological 
primacy of presence. Even Descartes retained this, when he gave his own interpretation to the 
Augustinian si fallor, sum (if I err, I exist). Evidence of existence springs from the cogito only as long 
as the cogito is actually thinking or doubting.8 Not only perception, but apperception, too, is 
instantaneous, and the Cartesian case is interesting, because it shows how presence is something 
extremely important even when the project is to create a rationalist methodology for modern sciences.  
 What presence is remains enigmatic though. The Greek word parousia is directly linked to 
being and can be understood as being which appears (phainesthai). Appearance was however already 
in ancient philosophy understood in different ways, Plato often stressing the illusory character of 
experience and Aristotle on the contrary insisting on the necessary role of phantasmata in all thinking. 
An ontology of experience must take this seriously. Illusion is then one aspect of appearance, which 
as such is quite real. (Nobody would contest that illusions exist.) The point of view of Augustine is 
different. In his famous theory of time – which is in fact also a theory of consciousness – presence 
(praesentia) has a central onto-theological role. The non-being of the past (which is not anymore) and 
of the forthcoming (which is not yet) is saved by the presence, by acts of remembering and foresight, 
which of course don't occur in the past and in the future even if they concern the past and the future. 
For the finite human being this presence is decisive as it represents an internal access to divine  
  
                     
8 AT VII, 25. French version: AT IX, 19. Augustine has several versions of the argument: the mentioned 
"si […] fallor sum" figures in De civitate dei XI.26. 
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omnipresence. As for Augustine, God remains omnipresent also in the medieval tradition and 
Aquinas defines God as pure actuality (actus purus).9 It is not necessary, however, to argue in this 
onto-theological way in order to point out the crucial ontological role of presence. Without presence 
nothing could happen and as Kierkegaard, Heidegger and others have pointed out, the now can also 
be a decisive moment, an øjeblikk.10 Any instant can become decisive, and it can be decisive, even if 
it is not recognized as such. Plato had similar thoughts about kairos. When the instant appears in its 
importance, we become troubled, we have to decide, choose our way, take responsibility of how the 
past is going to influence the future. The moment then becomes particularly intense. For many 
existential philosophers the intensity is however not so much apperceptive as rather decisive and 
Heidegger has – rightly, as it seems to me – even been accused of a certain "decisionism".11 In this 
way the conflict between active orientation towards the future on the one hand and apperceptive 
awareness of how the past is actually working towards something determinate on the other hand risks 
being forgotten. I would here prefer to defend the tradition of Reflexionsphilosophie and its roots in 
Greek conceptions of theoria, contemplation. 
 
 
 Appearing Reality 
 
 How is it, that there can be appearances? Pure presence is not sufficient and neither is the 
organizing capacity of patterns. One could suggest: through qualitative contents with specific 
relations to patterns the present moment becomes important and demands reactions through 
behaviour. If this is appearance, it does not imply any behaviouristic reduction of the psyche. On the 
contrary, it would show how intimate the relationship is between qualitative experience and behaviour 
– and how both depend on felt presence. I summarize: we would have three fundamental aspects of 
experience, closely working together: 1) ontological patterns, which are particularly familiar to us as 
dispositions, 2) qualitative contents which render appearances important and finally 3) the presence, 
necessary for the actualization of both patterns and qualities. An actual situation – the here and now 
– is somehow what can stimulate both patterns and qualitative contents.  
  
                     
9 Concerning Augustine's theory of time, see Confessiones XI. For more references, see Lindén 2011-2012. 
10 Concerning the Augenblick in Heidegger; the notion appears in several contexts, but of course also in the 
descriptions of temporality in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger 1967. Concerning Kierkegaard, see Begrebet 
Angest, in English Kierkegaard 1980. 
11  I here refer to Löwith 1984, especially p. 61-71. 
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 Appearance is what turns reality into experience, gives it situational importance. The 
qualitative contents in the appearances seem to be relatively independent and consist of thematic 
variations around a primordial dimension. I have chosen to say quality instead of idea or meaning for 
this dimension in order not to overstress intentionality that has often been taken as a criterion of the 
mental. Intending something is closely connected with a teleological directedness and it would be all 
too hasty to conceive all qualitative contents as something teleological. End-oriented meanings 
without doubt exist in perception and even hold an important position, but they seem to presuppose 
the kind of contents I have preferred to call qualities. 
 Imagination is probably still a helpful concept, if one remembers its philosophical history, 
often attributing to it a fundamental role not only in fantasies and illusions, but in actual sense 
perception, too. For Aristotle all activity of the sensitive psychic function (the aisthetikon) and even 
of the more intellectual noetikon involves such "images" (phantasmata).12 Imaginatio remains a 
central term in the medieval and in the later Latin tradition. Kant speaks of a productive imagination 
(produktive Einbildungskraft), fundamental to experience, which constitutes phenomena.13 Henri 
Bergson and other philosophers of a similar bent describe perception as an interested selection of 
images, which Bergson understands as essential aspects of reality itself.14 In all these cases there is 
the enigmatic question of how something can appear and the above mentioned philosophers in their 
own way want to give interpretations, which don't reduce appearance to the contrary term it is in the 
conceptual couple appearance and reality. The tendency is rather to stress that appearance is the way 
of reality to show itself.15  
 
 
 Empirical Exposition 
 
 How should we then relate qualitative contents to sensations? Taking into account that 
sensations presuppose exposition of the senses, one possibility is to attribute an exposing capacity to 
the qualities. Through these contents we become receptive for those aspects of the world, which have 
some bearing in a certain actual situation. (It would then be no coincidence that among the several 
meanings of the world sense we count both sensual faculty and meaning.) When we expose contents 
the world imposes ways to react through specific senses, whose major raison d'être is their aptness  
  
                     
12  De anima III 431a - 432a. 
13  Kant 1990, B 152. 
14  Bergson 2008, chapter 1, for example p. 12. 
15 Since perceptual experience seems to be heavily dependent on imagination – which is thus presupposed in 
experience –, it would also be difficult to regard ideal contents of experience only as reproductions of former 
perceptions.  
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to feel the world in relation to certain qualities – and different senses are stimulated in different 
ways just as different organisms with their different organs are differently disposed for the stimuli. 
In this way qualitative significance contributes to the exposition of the senses. This ekthetic16 
character of experience has been blurred by a long history of regarding the senses as purely receiving 
functions: passive and not active, receptive and not spontaneous, in short, as impressions without 
corresponding expressivity. The position I here have tried to sketch, would ascribe a crucial role to 
expression as a means of exposing contents and sensual experience would be more like assuming the 
tension through exposition, not like receiving pure impressions.   
  
 
 Apperception and Understanding 
 
 What then about apperception? The distinction between empirical and transcendental 
apperception, which in a certain sense saves the Cartesian conception of a pure consciousness in 
charge of experience and knowledge, loses its importance in this context. There is something 
convincing in the older idea that awareness only occurs occasionally, quite often so, but without 
being a continuous stream of thought, grounding all experience.17 From this point of view 
apperception is occasional and dependent on a felt presence, which stands in a certain conflict with 
the discerning ambitions of perception. Our interested focus on the world of phenomena 
necessitates precision and active determination (– both in the differentiating and the voluntarist 
sense –), but cannot simultaneously deepen its apperceptive resources, which are closely related 
to a certain indeterminacy. Bergson even tried to understand consciousness as something 
happening in a "zone of indeterminacy" (zone d'indétermination) and he claimed that dreams 
would be good examples of such apperceptive states.18 This certainly is an interesting point and is  
  
                     
16  ekthesis, i.e. exposition. 
17 Consciousness would then be something momentaneous and discontinuous of the kind the physicist and 
philosopher Palágyi proposed. Palágyi 1924, especially the second lecture. Palágyi does not however 
distinguish clearly between consciousness and epistemic acts and accordingly does not see any tension 
between consciousness and conceptual perception. His view is in this respect contrary to the Bergsonian. 
Cf. Palágyis discussion of dreams, p. 34-37. 
18 Bergson 2008, p. 29-30. Indeterminacy is for Bergson also something enabling freedom of will, but he 
does not identify indeterminacy and freedom in the way often criticized by philosophers influenced by Kant 
and Hegel. A mnemic dimension announces its presence in the indeterminate state and it is exactly this 
which leads Bergson to stress the close relationship between dreams, "pure recollection" (souvenir pur) and 
consciousness. Without the mnemic component voluntary actions would not be possible. 
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supported by the fact that imagination can intensify experience without being particularly 
distinct. It does not however explain the relation between apperception and reflection. 
 Intense apperception does not of course imply a corresponding reflective understanding – 
but neither does it exclude or impede understanding. In fact, understanding can be seen as a 
reflective state which occurs in consciousness, when there was a sufficiently convincing 
preparation by qualitative contents and conceptual patterns. As in the case of other perceptive 
differentiation, however, conceptual differentiation alone cannot offer any reflexive 
understanding. Understanding happens in apperception, even if it certainly allows different 
strategies and processes to bring it about. Experience is constituted by an interplay of patterns, 
qualities and presence. Depending on our orientation, different aspects of the qualitative contents 
are brought into play: in formal enterprises semiotically less connotated ideas, in understanding 
something rather connotated, which is apt to suggest as much inherent meaning as possible in the 
specific context.  
 The traditional difference between explanatory and understanding experiential strategies 
could then be seen as the difference between dealing with and understanding phenomena – even 
if every form of human knowledge certainly contains aspects of both. However, the emphasis is 
different in the two cases: dealing with phenomena means adjustment to or mastering of real 
patterns, not deepening the apperceptive belonging to or dependence on qualitative reality. Who 
deals with reality is attentive and interested in new results, whereas the understanding stance has 
only a very moderate interest in results and prefers to contemplate what is. In fact, this was exactly 
how Aristotle conceived the contemplative life, the bios theoretikos. 
 I close with a general question about the suggested tripartite scheme and the corresponding 
defence of a strong ontological concept of experience. What are its implications for the main tenor 
of transcendental philosophy, i.e. the idea that everything known is known on the basis of different 
conditions of possibility? As far as I can see, the legacy of transcendental arguments remains, but 
has to be separated from a long modern tradition of mentalist philosophy 
(Bewußtseinsphilosophie). In a certain sense, the intention has been to offer an alternative 
conception of conditions of possibility, with ingredients both of Aristotelian and Augustinian 
psychology. Such a suggestion, it seems to me, has the advantage of surmounting all too dualist 
distinctions between the purely physical and the mental. With regard to the initial remarks on 
interdisciplinary challenges, this conception also suggests that the human sciences, the 
Geisteswissenschaften, are not confined to a narrow field of human culture, but offer a perspective on 
reality as it shows itself – and has shown itself in history – and on the crucial role of quality in the life 













































































































 As this text began with somewhat schematic definitions, I conclude in a similar way with 
some claims: 
 
a. How something appears as something depends on qualities expressed. 
 
b) Ontological qualities must be distinguished from ontological patterns. 
 
c) The term "sensation" is ambiguous as it refers to both qualitative aspects and only presenting ones. 
In the case of qualities there is always a qua, i.e. an as, which stands for content. In order to distinguish 
between these aspects, I propose the notion of feeling for the presenting function and sensation for a 
feeling with qualities exposed through senses. Sensation is understood as the feeling of what happens 
when expressed qualities are in a certain tension with the patterns they confront at a specific moment.  
 
d) Without qualitative expressions experience has no content. 
 
e) As every experience, perception, too, needs expressed qualities and it even insists on these in order 
to deal with patterns. As intentional experience perception "tests" identical meanings and thus 
qualifies experience for better discernment and orientation.  
 
f) Focusing on something through perception is in conflict with simultaneous awareness of the 
qualitative implication in one's own activity. 
 
g) As in the case of sensation and perception, apperception, too, is dependent on expressed qualitative 
contents, but it does not, like perception, aim at better dealing with patterns and neither does it, like 
sensation, only assume influence. Apperception contains an interrogation concerning qualities 
involved in an instantaneous experience (which can be both of a more sensual and of a more 
perceptive kind). It tends to a qualitative resonance, which only indirectly can improve orientation.  
 
h) Not only patterns, but also qualities and presence manifest reality.  
 
i) Illusions are real and illuminating. 
 
j) What is real, must not be correct in epistemic contexts. 
 
k) Through concepts (logoi) we have access to the interaction between patterns and qualified contents. 
 
l) Reflection is a conceptually guided apperception with the aim of better understanding what 
happens. It differs from imagination in being conceptual and from differentiating perception through 
its backwards oriented and critical stance. (Re-flexio means to be bent backwards.) 
 




n) The given has a crucial status, when we want to understand reality. 
 
o) Foresight and discerning of relevant aspects are decisive in dealing with reality. 
 
p) The distinction of an ontological pattern alone can never render the pattern important. Importance 
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